Prior Juvenile Adjudications as Strikes |
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Prior juvenile wardship adjudications may serve as strikes if the
juvenile was 16 years of age or older at the time he committed the prior
offense and was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court because he committed an
offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code. (Penal Code section 667, subdivision (d)(3).) The Supreme
Court has ruled that a prior juvenile adjudication for an offense that would be
a strike if it were the subject of an adult conviction is a strike even if the
offense is not listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision
(b), so long as, in the prior juvenile proceeding, the juvenile was adjudged a
ward of the juvenile court because he or she committed an offense listed in
subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, even if
the 707(b) offense is not the same as the offense currently alleged as a
strike. (People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1.)
The use of
juvenile adjudications as strikes is particularly unfair, because juveniles are
not entitled to trial by jury. "[J]uveniles enjoy no state or federal due
process or equal protection right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings."
(People v. Fowler (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 581, 585.) The courts do not
consider juries essential to reliable fact-finding, and "[t]he three strikes
law is not grounded on technicalities of definitions, but is based on findings
of factual guilt." (Id. at 584.) A determination of guilt by a unanimous
jury, rather than by one possibly biased or eccentric judge, is apparently a
mere dispensable technicality, at least where juveniles are concerned.
Juveniles are not entitled to juries because supposedly they are not subjected
to the harshness of the criminal law but instead are provided the paternal
guidance of the juvenile court system, in which "the end result of a
declaration of delinquency 'is significantly different from and less onerous
than a finding of criminal guilt.'" (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403
U.S. 528, 540, quoting In re Terry (1970) 438 Pa. 339, 349-350; 265 A.
2d 350, 355.) The fanciful notion that juveniles are spared the harsh
consequences of a criminal conviction has, astonishingly, survived the use of
juvenile adjudications as strikes. In In re Myresheia W. (1998) 61
Cal.App.4th 734 the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that, in light of the
Three Strikes law's use of adjudications as strikes, juveniles should be
entitled to juries. "Even considering the Three Strikes potential, the end
result of a declaration of delinquency remains different from a finding of
criminal guilt in adult proceedings." (Id. at p. 741.) Consider that the
juvenile accused of offenses against the penal laws is prosecuted by a district
attorney; punished by incarceration and fines designed to protect the public
and to hold him accountable for his acts; and subjected to adverse consequences
that last well into adulthood, including the use of juvenile adjudications as
strikes to increase the punishment for crimes committed as an adult. Where
is the difference that justifies denying juveniles the right to trial by
jury?
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000)
530 U.S. 466, suggests that a change may be coming. Apprendi held that any
fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increases a defendant's
sentence beyond the otherwise-applicable maximum, must be tried to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It would seem to follow from
Apprendi that because the facts relating to a prior offense
which was the subject of a juvenile adjudication were never decided by a jury, those
facts should not be allowed to increase a sentence for a new offense.
Unfortunately, the courts have not extended Apprendi's reasoning that far.
A recent
Ninth Circuit case applies Apprendi to a sentence-increasing allegation
of a prior juvenile adjudication but instead of concluding that the prior
adjudication cannot be used to increase the sentence, ruled that it cannot
be used unless a jury decides that the prior adjudication in fact occurred.
The case is
United States v. Tighe (9th Cir. 2001) 266 F.3d 1187.
The Ninth Circuit understood that the Supreme Court excepted prior convictions from
the rule requiring jury determination of every fact that increases a sentence
because, as the Tighe court put it, "prior convictions have been, by their
very nature, subject to the fundamental triumvirate of procedural protections
intended to guarantee the reliability of criminal convictions: fair notice,
reasonable doubt and the right to a jury trial." In contrast to prior adult
convictions, prior juvenile adjudications have never been subject to the
protection of the right to a jury trial. This reasoning should have led the
Ninth Circuit to rule that prior juvenile adjudications may never be used
to extend a sentence for a subsequent crime. But instead the Tighe
court seems to think that there's no constitutional violation so long as the jury
in the later case decides
that the defendant had previously been adjudicated a
juvenile delinquent by reason of a qualifying felony offense, even though
no jury ever
determined that the defendant had committed that offense! Suppose the prior
juvenile adjudication had omitted the other protections mentioned by the Tighe
court -- fair notice and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Surely the Ninth Circuit would not say that a
juvenile court's
ruling, upon a mere preponderance of the evidence (or less), in a case where the
juvenile had
no notice of the charge against him, could be used to extend a subsequent
sentence provided the jury in the later case decides that the juvenile court
judge had indeed made that ruling. It is bewildering to see the Ninth Circuit
reasoning so well up to a point, and
then stumbling so badly in applying its own reasoning.
The injustice of using prior juvenile adjudications as strikes is particularly acute
where the juvenile adjudication occurred before there was a Three Strikes law.
As a juvenile, Israel
Cervantes gave up the opportunity to be tried as an adult before a jury because
he was told that juvenile adjudications could not be used to increase his
punishment for any future offenses. That was indeed the law at that time. Then the
Three Strikes law changed the effect of juvenile adjudications so that later
those juvenile adjudications were used as strikes against Mr. Cervantes. He
complained that this was unfair, because he had given up the opportunity for a
jury in reliance on the assurance that he would not suffer any increased
punishment for future crimes if adjudicated as a juvenile (without a jury.) The
court ruled that there had been no actual bargain, even though there was
reliance on a law that subsequently changed. The unfairness of such a change
after reliance on the prior state of the law left the court unmoved. (People
v. Cervantes (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 28.)
In some ways the law treats the juvenile offender more harshly
than the adult convict. There are some offenses that will serve as a strike for
the juvenile even though they are not strikes for adults. These include aiding
and abetting an assault by any means of force likely to produce great bodily
injury (Welf. & Inst. Code § 707, subd. (b)(14),
manufacturing controlled substances (id., § 707, subd. (b)(20), and escape
from juvenile hall causing great bodily injury (id., § 707, subd. (b)(22)). The
Supreme Court has
acknowledged that this disparate treatment of prior offenses as strikes raises
a question of equal protection, but has declined to decide the issue until
faced with a case that squarely presents it. (People v. Garcia (1991) 21
Cal.4th 1.) The Fifth District of the Court of Appeal has decided that such
disparity does indeed violate the equal protection clause (People v.
Leng (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1), but it remains to be seen whether other
districts or the Supreme Court will agree.
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3-Strikes.
Date last modified: 10/4/02.
