Families to Amend California's 3-Strikes ("FACTS") is a state-wide organization and its purpose is to promote legislation that will modify the 3-Strikes law so it is applicable only to violent and serious offenses. FACTS represents the people who have been caught in the 3-Strikes net who have not demonstrated a history of actual violence toward other people. In addition, we also represent special concerns for the poor and minorities who have been disproportionately caught in the 3-Strikes net.
More specifically, FACTS represents: (1) the people who obtained Strikes for convictions for burglaries of unoccupied dwellings, robberies, and other such acts that resulted in little or no actual physical harm to other individuals; (2) the people who have been convicted of 1st or 2nd Strikes many years ago, demonstrated that they had reformed their lives, and later were caught in the 3-Strikes law for non-violent or non-serious convictions (e.g., drug possession or petty theft); (3) the people who pled guilty to crimes they did not actually commit because they were coerced by prosecutors who threatened much larger sentences if they went to trial and had no realization that such guilty pleas would someday be used for extreme sentencing enhancements under the later promulgated 3-Strikes law; (4) the people who have received Strikes because they were represented by inadequate counsel or underfunded public defenders; (5) the people that have received Strikes who are part of a racial group that has received Strikes in a disproportionately large number relative to its population percentage; and (6) the people who have made guilty pleas to extreme sentences because prosecutors threatened the more extreme 2nd or 3rd Strike sentences (hereafter all of the above are defined as "The People FACTS Represents").
In addition, FACTS supports victims rights groups and is acting
consistently with their goals because we are concerned (1) with the
disproportionality in sentencing that people who have committed one or two
extremely violent acts are receiving relative to The People FACTS Represents
and (2) that the many of those who committed extremely violent acts are being
released from prison early to make room for The People FACTS Represents.
Lungren starts his article with a list of statistics that demonstrates the record decreases in crime rates experienced in California for 1995 and 1996 and states, "I suggest it is in large part due to California's passage of a 'three strikes and you're out' law, which has done more to stop revolving-door justice than any other measure in state or federal law." FACTS takes a different view: FACTS suggests that California is experiencing record increases in abuses committed by the California government on its people in large part due to California's passage of the 3-Strikes law, which has done more to destroy people's lives for minor offenses than any other measure in state or federal law.
Crime rates are difficult to interpret--especially only a couple of years of data.(2) In general, since 1992, the nation has been experiencing a decline in crime rates. The problem with interpreting crime rates is that such interpretations have much to do with the question of "what causes crime?" And, as most criminologists can tell you, there is not a simple soundbite that has the answer. The debate on what causes crime can primarily be broken down into the three perspectives of sociological, psychological and biological. Criminologists study the perspectives in a variety of ways: there are some that (1) only view crime from one of the perspectives, (2) take into account all of the perspectives but lean heavily toward one of the perspectives, and (3) other balancings. One of the greater problems with crime rates is that the media likes to focus on the aggregate crime rates and wants simple answers for why "crime in general" has risen or fallen. FACTS believes that the motivations of a drug addict, a sexual molester, a serial killer, an anti-trust violator, a shoplifter, or a gang-member might all be very different. There are no simple answers.
The other problem with the crime rates is the accuracy of the figures. Reported crime from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports are based on definitions that may be interpreted differently in different areas of the country and may have differences over time on what people will "report" as crimes (for instance, a simple burglary in New York City might not be reported, but may be more likely to be reported in a small town). Victimization surveys (e.g., National Crime Victimization Surveys) take more time to compile and also have problems with the accuracy of the data. In addition, "crime" itself is defined by the government--and what might be a "crime" today might not have been a "crime" yesterday (or emphasized more or less depending on the politics of the place and time period).
The fact that crime was decreasing since 1991, prior to the enactment of the 3-Strikes law, demonstrates that other factors have been involved. The most damaging evidence to Lungren giving credit to the 3-Strikes law for the decrease in crime rates, however, is the comparison of California to the rest of the states in the nation. Based on Uniform Crime Reports from 1994-1995, in non-3 Strike states, violent crime fell by 4.6%, and in California, violent crime fell by 4.2% (in all 3-Strike states, crime fell by only 1.7%)(3)
The general decrease in recent California crime rates may be the result
of many other factors than the 3-Strikes law: age-demographics(4), gang-war cycles(5), the economy, the aging of the drug markets,
the increasing influence of religion,(6)
statistical averaging(7)--maybe even the decline
of the materialistic 80's can take part of the credit.
Later in Lungren's article, he states his belief that deterrence "is
grossly underestimated" and that it has a "dramatic effect on the behavior of
individuals." FACTS agrees that there is a simple logic that says if you
increase punishments to people found guilty of some crimes that some deterrence
will probably occur. For instance, if you impose the death penalty on traffic
violators, FACTS has no doubt that many people will slow down their driving
(and probably decrease the number of deaths on our highways). The questions
that arise, however, are: (1) Is the penalty "just" for the people who violate
the law (because there will still be some violators)? and (2) Are the costs of
imposing such a severe penalty outweighed by the benefits?
"Justice" has always been a vague concept defined more by our cultural and historical experiences and "feelings" than upon purely utilitarian calculations. Humans cling to concepts of "justice" because of our own ignorance and the limitations of science. We recognize the inadequacies of our utilitarian theories, models and formulas and the problems with the observations and data which are entered into the models and formulas. Because of such inadequacies, we need concepts of "justice."
One of the foundations of "justice" in the United States, and perhaps the world, has been that people should not be punished for what they "might" do, but what they have "actually" done. The "injustice" of giving the death penalty to speeders is felt because the speeder has not individually caused "harm" yet to society, but represents only the "possibility" of causing harm.
One of the greatest problems with California's 3-Strikes law and Lungren's deterrence theories is that it is punishing people for what they "might" do. In many cases, the state has shown evidence of individuals to have committed only a couple of non-violent felonies (e.g., breaking into unoccupied dwellings) and a minor "petty theft" or "possession charge" and then under the 3-Strikes law justifies a 25 years-to-life sentence because of what the person "might" do. FACTS believes that, once again, an "injustice" is felt because the person is being punished because they represent only a "possibility" of causing harm.
As presented earlier, there is much evidence that suggests that the 3-Strikes law has had little or no affect on the decrease in crime rates in California. Utilitarian arguments, therefore, could be ended here. If the 3-Strikes law does not decrease crime, then there are no benefits. However, for the benefit of those that still believe 3-Strikes does have a deterrent effect and only want to consider its utilitarian aspects, FACTS will next demonstrate the problems with Lungren's utilitarian model and the data included within the model.
The most publicly acknowledged problem with the 3-Strikes law by the news media has been the "cost" it will impose on taxpayers. A study by the Rand Corporation demonstrates that the 3-Strikes law will ultimately triple California's prison population over the next 25 years and cost an average of $5.5 billion each year for the next 25 years, totaling $137.5 billion by the 25th year. (8) Because 3-Strikers go to maximum security prisons, they are costing the state over $21,000 per year in annual operating costs and over $113,000 for every new prison bed that is built.(9)
Lungren attempts to dismiss the costs of incarceration by stating that "the costs of crimes committed against our citizens is higher than the cost of incarcerating them" and then attributes ALL of the drop in crime in 1994 and 1995 to the 3-Strikes law. He then multiplies the decreasing crime rates by the "estimated" costs of particular crimes (from $2,940,000 for each murder to $1,400 for each burglary) to calculate the following cost savings:
First, FACTS disagrees with the data Lungren puts in his model. His most significant error is that he attributes ALL of the drop in crime to the 3-Strikes law--which, as argued previously, ignores all national trends and other possible causes.(10) Second, the most significant amount is attributable to murder which he calculates at $2,940,000 for each murder.(11) The problem with the $2,940,000 amount is that it is a figure that has been primarily derived at by jury awards from wrongful death cases. Because Lungren is using the amount to justify government expenditures, FACTS believes a more appropriate amount would be the minimal amount that the government could spend elsewhere to save lives. For instance, if it is shown that for each additional $1,000,000 spent on Medi-Cal a life will be saved, then this should be the amount that Lungren values for a life in his murder statistics. There is no reason that a life that could be saved by other government expenditures should be different from a life that could be saved in the criminal justice system. FACTS does not know how much is the minimal amount that would save an individual life in medical situations, but FACTS is confident that if the state researched the question that it would be lower than $2,940,000.(12) In addition, any pain and suffering costs contained within Lungren's rape, robbery, aggravated assault and burglary statistics should likewise be adjusted to the minimal amounts that the state could spend to alleviate similar pain and suffering in other state expenditures.
The major problem with Lungren's model is that it is too simple and does not take into account many other variables. One of the greatest costs regarding incarceration for "lifers" is the additional medical costs that will be incurred when they get older.(13) In addition, Lungren fails to mention the additional costs in the court system and police enforcement related to 3-Strikes.(14) However, some of the most significant and real additional costs that Lungren fails to put in his model are the costs to the people convicted under the 3-Strikes law. The inhumanity, pain and suffering, and death of prisoners, the pain and suffering of the prisoners' relatives and friends, the loss of employment and income to the family (which may have to receive welfare), the costs of transportation for prison visits and long-distance telephone calls and other miscellaneous costs--these are all real costs that cannot be ignored.(15)
There are additional long-term costs that need to be considered. Individuals that are caught by law enforcement may be more prone to try to flee or hurt the police officers or witnesses in order to avoid a "25-to-life" sentence.(16) As income producing individuals are pulled from their families, many of those family members will probably fall to lower income levels leading them to move to worse neighborhoods and increasing the probability that they will commit street crimes in the future to survive.(17) The 3-Strikers that are lucky enough to survive their sentences will have few, if any, skills to obtain gainful employment when they are released and may turn to a life of crime because they know how to survive better in prison than they do outside of prison. And, of most importance, but probably the hardest to quantify, is the cost to society of creating many individuals who believe the governmental system is unjust. The prisoners, families and friends of the prisoners all recognize the 3-Strikes law to be extremely draconian and unjust and have a growing antagonism toward the government and society.(18) How will these people interact with a society they feel promotes an injustice to humanity?
And finally, our biggest argument to Lungren's simple incarceration model is that he uses it to justify the entire 3-Strikes law. FACTS does not represent all of the people that have been captured in the 3-Strikes net. FACTS is only concerned with amending the law so it is not applicable to non-violent and non-serious offenses. Because there is not enough evidence that The People FACTS Represents have a likelihood of committing extremely violent acts, the murder, rapes, and aggravated assault savings figures used by Lungren would be almost totally irrelevant when considering the amendment to the 3-Strikes law that FACTS proposes to have legislated.
In summary, FACTS believes that if one goes through the recalculations, the cost-benefits of amending the 3-Strikes law so that it is only applicable to violent and serious offenses would overwhelmingly be better than the costs-benefits to society if the 3-Strikes law is not amended.(19)
Excluded from Lungren's cost-effectiveness analysis are alternative solutions to decreasing crime. Because the state of California is concerned about minimizing its tax spending, it would seem logical that the state would want to spend money on programs that would result in the lowest crime rates per each dollar spent. The same Rand Corporation study that Lungren makes reference to in his article demonstrates that dollars spent on graduation incentives for high risk youths will decrease crime 3 to 4 times more than the 3-Strikes law.(20) In addition, the study shows dollars spent on parent training programs are twice as effective as the 3-Strikes law, and dollars spent on delinquent supervision programs are as effective as the 3-Strikes law.(21) In another study conducted in 1997, the Rand Corporation concluded that spending dollars on the treatment of heavy drug users would reduce about 10 times more serious crime against people and property than conventional law enforcement and 15 times more than mandatory minimums.(22) FACTS believes the California government's disregard of these studies demonstrates that they are more dedicated to ideological entrenchment and political self-interest then they are with actually trying to decrease crime.
Lungren makes reference to a statistic that "226 more paroled felons chose to move to California than move out." And "[a]fter 'three strikes took effect, the flow reversed: 1,335 more paroled felons chose to leave California in 1995 than to enter." He then goes on to state "We've gone from being a net importer of paroled felons to a net exporter! Coincidence? Hardly."
First, Lungren's use of these statistics demonstrates how the government has and will try to misuse statistics to uphold their unjust policies. Investigating "request" statistics demonstrates that the exact same number of parolees have requested to move out of the state of California every year for the last five years, including the last two years three strikes has been in effect. The only thing that's happened is the Department of Corrections has granted more requests over the last two years.(23)
Second, FACTS does not think that the government should necessarily be proud of such a statistic. Throughout world and U.S. history people have fled countries and states because they were persecuted by their government's unjust laws. To the extent that felons on parole are leaving the state, FACTS believes that this is simply an indication of the injustice of California's criminal justice system relative to the more just systems of other states.
The 3-Strikes law, when applied to 3-Strikers, is a huge net that has snared people convicted of extremely violent crimes down to such non-violent crimes of burglary of unoccupied dwellings and then gives them all a sentence of at least 25-to-life in prison. FACTS recognizes that there is a tremendous difference between serial killers and people who break into their neighbor's house to steal a computer. The harm to society by such different acts are considerably different.(24)
Lungren tries to cover up the disproportional sentencing consequences of the 3-Strikes law by classifying ALL 3-Strikers as habitual criminals. FACTS does not believe this to be the case and criminological studies demonstrate the opposite to be true. To review all the literature is too exhaustive a task, but one example is the age demographic studies. These studies show that a large percentage of crime is committed by 19 to 24 year-olds who then "age-out" into non-criminal roles in society.(25) Also, FACTS represents many 3-Strikers who committed only one activity but received multiple counts and thus multiple strikes from the one activity. These people, often many years later, then made a small infraction, such as possession of less than a gram of cocaine or petty theft and received a 25-to-life sentence under the 3-Strikes law. FACTS cannot find any study which demonstrates that one activity and then a later small infraction demonstrates that these people are "habitual criminals."
In addition, FACTS represents many drug addicts. These individuals can be considered "habitual criminals" because they do have a habit of breaking state-defined drug laws. However, to automatically classify them as equal with people who commit extremely violent acts is totally unjustified. Once again FACTS cannot find any evidence that shows drug addicts (who may have been convicted of one or two acts of burglary) as automatically leading to individuals that commit extremely violent acts.
Lungren's stance on "accountability" demonstrates old model methods of solving problems. Even the business world has recognized better management philosophies that do not necessarily blame individuals when problems arise, but rather look for areas of improvement with the process or the system.(26) By blaming the process or system rather than individuals, businesses have discovered two things: (1) employees are happier and work better in a more cooperative environment because they are not as worried about being fired and (2) long-run solutions to problems occur more often because the underlying root of the problem is corrected rather than simply putting another employee in the position and having the same problem occur again. The wisdom behind this management philosophy is the same as the wisdom of looking for the root causes of crime.
FACTS, though, agrees that there should be some "accountability." But, FACTS disagrees with California's current method and focus of "accountability." First, there is too much focus on "accountability" through imprisonment as the means of solving problems; second, FACTS does not believe The People FACTS Represents should be "accountable" in as equal a manner as people who commit extremely violent acts; third, FACTS believes the criminal justice system is biased in its "accountability" of poor and minorities; and finally, FACTS believes government officials should be held more "accountable" for their decision-making.
The previous sections on "proportionality" and "alternatives to incarceration" explain the reasoning regarding the first two items, and the third and fourth items are summed up as follows: FACTS believes the criminal justice system should be held more accountable for its biased decision-making against the poor and minorities.(27) FACTS believes statistics should be continuously compiled which demonstrate the differences in sentencing that are given by prosecutors and judges (at the individual, county and state levels) and such statistics should show the breakdown by socioeconomic status and racial and ethnic heritage of the people being sentenced.(28) In addition, to the extent such statistics reveal a significant bias by individuals or counties in their sentencing practices because of socioeconomic status or racial and ethnic heritage, then those government officials should be held "accountable."
Contrary to Lungren's belief that the 3-Strikes law represents a "clear and certain penalty," FACTS believes the opposite to be true. FACTS has gathered many stories that show many of The People FACTS Represents have been convicted under the 3-Strikes law have had no knowledge when apprehended that they would be included under the 3-Strikes law and are surprised and in disbelief as the process puts them in prison for 25 years-to-life.(29)
First, because of its retroactive nature, before 1994 it was impossible for people to know that the acts they committed (or, more likely, the acts they agreed in settlements with prosecutors to), would someday be used to justify a "25 years-to-life" sentence. Second, because the 3-Strikes law was heavily advertised as the way to get the people who commit three extremely violent acts off the street, many 3-Strikers have not known and still do not know that it is applicable for burglary and non-violent and non-serious offenses. Third, the law is complex--even if 3-Strikers have the written law in front of them (and with a lawyer present), it is difficult to determine what acts do and do not qualify under its provisions.
The only thing simple about the 3-Strikes law has been its soundbite advertisement of "3-Strikes, you're out"--and like most good advertisements, the illusion from the soundbite hid the realities of the product it was selling.
Lungren states the fact that voters "overwhelmingly passed the initiative, by 72 percent to 28" and uses this as a justification for the law (even though he does not support other passed public initiatives such as the use of marijuana for medical purposes). FACTS, however, believes the voters were voting out of a media endorsed fear against people who commit extremely violent acts and did not properly weigh the consequences or realize all the people that would be included within its net.
There is much evidence that demonstrates that even though crime rates were decreasing since 1991, the media flooded the news programs with stories about murder and violent crime. From 1992 to 1993, the three major television networks--ABC, CBS, NBC--increased their stories about crime from 785 to 1,632; including an increase in stories about murder from 104 to 329. Moreover, in the second half of 1993 there was an increase in the monthly news coverage of 111 stories about murder and assault, a 68 percent increase compared to the average of 66 stories per month in the first half of the year.(30) As a result of this media emphasis, 87 percent of U.S. residents in a 1993 poll said that crime was higher than a year earlier, 88 percent in a 1994 poll agreed that crime was at an all-time high and 52 percent in another 1994 poll named crime as the "most important problem" (topping all other concerns) facing the United States. This last figure was only 9 percent eighteen months earlier and only 1 percent in 1990.(31)
FACTS believes our legislators and government officials should look beyond the media induced fear and recognize the advantages and justice of amending the 3-Strikes law for only violent and serious offenders.(32) The fact that the 3-Strikes law allows for a two-thirds vote by legislators to modify the law indicates that the public recognizes the legislature should step in and make modifications when the law they created turns out to be an unjust or bad law. FACTS believes our legislators should use their professional judgement and be in the forefront to changing the law instead of waiting until the day the public wakes up and recognizes the problems with the law (which will eventually happen, but may take many years at the expense of much taxpayer money and suffering of those unjustly convicted under the law).(33)
The people of California will be better off if the 3-Strikes law is amended so that it is only applicable to violent and serious offenders. There is little, if any, evidence that indicates the 3-Strikes law is an effective deterrence. To the extent that there can be any benefits attributable to deterrence because of the 3-Strikes law, FACTS believes that such deterrence is minimal (especially with regards to The People FACTS Represents) and does not outweigh the injustice and costs of the law. The 3-Strikes law is unjust because it focuses on incarcerating people for what they "might" do instead of what they have "actually" done, and because it has no regard to proportionality. While FACTS also recognizes that people should be held "accountable" for crimes they commit (1) FACTS does not believe extreme unjust penalties are the correct means of doing so, and (2) FACTS does not believe that poor and minorities should be as disproportionally held "accountable" when there is much evidence that there are many criminal activities by non-poor and non-minorities which are very costly to society but are rarely held "accountable."
The 3-Strikes law does not reflect common sense but rather a misinformed public that had an irrational fear created by the news media; it does not present a clear penalty because of its retroactive nature, the manner in which it was advertised against extremely violent acts and its complexity; and it invests in an unjust destruction of lives at enormous expense to the taxpayer. The legislators of California need to recognize and vote for an amendment to the 3-Strikes law so it is only applicable for violent and serious offenses.
Caulkins, Johnathon P., et al. 1997. Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences: Throwing Away the Key or the Taxpayer's Money? Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
Collard, Ron. 1989. Total Quality: Success Through People. London: Institute of Personnel Management.
Geis, Gilbert. 1996. "A Base on Balls for White-Collar Criminals," pp. 244-64 in Shichor, David and Dale K. Sechrest (eds.), Three Strikes and You're Out: Vengeance As Public Policy. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Greenwood, Peter, et al. 1994. Three Strikes and You're Out: Estimated Benefits and Costs of California's New Mandatory Sentencing Law. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
Greenwood, Peter, et al. 1996. Diverting Children from a Life of Crime: Measuring Costs and Benefits. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
Hills, S. (ed.). 1987. Corporate violence: Injury and death for profit. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.
Klein, Malcolm W. 1995. "Street Gang Cycles," pp. 217-36 in Wilson, James Q. and Joan Petersilia (eds.), Crime: Twenty-Eight Leading Experts Look at the Most Pressing Problem of Our Time. San Francisco: ICS Press.
Lungren, Dan. 1996. "Three Cheers for Three Strikes: California Enjoys a Record Drop in Crime." Policy Review: The Journal of American Citizenship. Nov.-Dec., 80.
Miller, Ted R., Mark A. Cohen and Brian Wiersema. 1996. Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look. The National Institute of Justice. NCJ 155282.
Sharpe, W.F. 1971. Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Steffensemeier, Darrell, and Emilie Allan. 1995. "Criminal Behavior: Gender and Age," pp. 83-113 in Sheley, Joseph F. (ed.), Criminology: A Contemporary Handbook. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Tammy O. Tengs. 1994. "The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Societal Investments in Life-Saving," Optimizing Societal Investments in the Prevention of Premature Death (Chap. 2), Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.
Tengs, Tammy O., Miriam E. Adams, Joseph S. Pliskin, Dana Gelb Safran, Joanna E. Siegel, Milton C. Weinstein, and John D. Graham. 1995. "Five-Hundred Life Saving Interventions and Their Cost-Effectiveness." Risk Analysis, Vol. 15, No. 3.
Tengs, Tammy O. and John D. Graham. 1996. "The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments in Life-Saving," pp. 167-182 in Hahn, Robert W. (ed.), Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from Regulation. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press and Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press.
1. This article is a response to an article written by Dan Lungren, Attorney General of the State of California, which appears in the Policy Review: The Journal of American Citizenship, Nov.-Dec. 1996, No. 80, titled "Three Cheers for Three Strikes: California enjoys a record drop in crime."
2. It should be recognized that FACTS is at a distinct disadvantage to argue about statistics generated by the government. Because FACTS is arguing against policies put in place by those that are in power of the government, FACTS believes that there should be a certain amount of skepticism associated with statistics generated by that same government. The government has much power in how it analyzes, measures, records and communicates the information that it collects. To think that the government doesn't release data in a manner that supports its own policies is naïve. In addition, because there is very little precedent which holds government officials accountable for misinforming the public, FACTS believes there are strong incentives for them to do so.
3. "Striking Out: The Crime Control Impact of 'Three-Strikes' Laws," Vincent Schiraldi and Tara-Jen Ambrosio, The Justice Policy Institute, March 1997.
4. It is pretty well documented that the vast majority of street crime is committed by men within the age brackets of 19 through 24. See Steffensemeier and Allan, "Criminal Behavior: Gender and Age." For whatever reason (perhaps burnout, maturity, better job opportunities, etc.), after the age of 24, most offenders decide not to pursue a life of crime and are generally not heard from by the criminal justice system again. In fact, snaring individuals who are within this 19 to 24-year-old age group may be more detrimental to society. Rather than simply "aging" out of a life of crime, the criminal justice system may have the criminogenic effect of propelling them into a life of crime because society "labels" them as criminals.
5. Malcolm Klein, who specializes in gang research, has demonstrated that gang violence typically increases and decreases in a cyclical pattern that usually has nothing to do with the police and sentencing programs that are in place. In particular, Klein gives credit to the decline in gang violence in Los Angeles because "gang members in one of the hottest areas 'agreed they were tired of the warfare and the violence.'" He also notes that many times when rates are decreasing, the police, politicians and the media will jump on the bandwagon proclaiming the programs in place should be given credit. Klein, "Street Gang Cycles."
6. In Orange County, average attendance at Sunday Mass at Catholic churches increased by 34,312 from 1989 to 1997 and the number of registered Catholics in the Diocese of Orange grew from 501,375 to 603,589 during the same period. "Catholic Masses Packing 'Em In In O.C" by Leslie Berestein, The Orange County Register, August 21, 1997, A1.
7. As the nation experiences a country-wide decrease in crime, the states such as California that had the highest crime rates will probably experience the greater decreases in crime simply because of the mathematical phenomenon involved in averaging and the changes in a statistical distribution. Financial investment theories that try to estimate the causes in the changes in stock prices take this phenomenon into account when they calculate Beta under the Capital Asset Pricing Model. See Sharpe, Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets.
8. Greenwood, Peter, et al., Three Strikes and You're Out: Estimated Benefits and Costs of California's New Mandatory Sentencing Law. FACTS recognizes that these amounts are probably subject to adjustment because the Rand Corporation conducted its study in 1994 and since then there has been a greater decrease in crime rates (and a greater increase in the bottlenecks in the court system) such that the total number of people going to prison under 3-Strikes has not been as significant as previously estimated.
9. Greenwood, Peter, et al., Diverting Children from a Life of Crime: Measuring Costs and Benefits; and "The Price of Punishment: The Booming Business of Running California's Prisons" Los Angeles Times, multi-part series, October 18, 1994.
10. At an October 14, 1997 California Assembly Public Safety hearing held in Los Angeles, Peter Greenwood was asked to give a ballpark figure for the amount of decrease in crime in California attributable to the whole 3-Strikes law. Greenwood said that at most it could only be "10%." Therefore, taking this ballpark figure, the amount that could be accounted to just the non-violent and non-serious offenses would be even less than the 10% amount.
11. Even though Lungren's article fails to make a citation, he obviously has taken his "cost of crime" amounts from the controversial study by Miller, Cohn and Wiersema, Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look, p. 9.
12. Recent cost-effectiveness studies demonstrate that one life would be saved for every $165,583 spent on annual mammography and breast exams for women aged 35 to 49. Other studies demonstrate that one life can be saved at even lesser cost for government expenditures on influenza vaccinations for people over the age of 5 and on prenatal care. Tammy O. Tengs, "The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Societal Investments in Life-Saving." See also Tammy O. Tengs and John D. Graham, "The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments in Life-Saving" p. 167 and Tammy O. Tengs, et al., "Five-Hundred Life Saving Interventions and Their Cost-Effectiveness."
13. See "The Price of Punishment: The Booming Business of Running California's Prisons," Los Angeles Times, multi-part series, October 18, 1994.
14. Three-Strikers are taking their cases to juries more often than settling with hard-nosed prosecutors who are being strict in their enforcement of the 3-Strikes law. The criminal court system has been so backed-up that civil cases have had to be delayed in some counties so the 3-Strike cases could proceed. Costs to be considered are the additional employees and materials needed for the court proceedings and additional people taken out of society to serve on juries. See "3-strikes cases proving costly" by Stuart Pfeifer, Orange County Register, June 10, 1996, M1, 4. In addition, there are additional law enforcement costs: Police have to investigate, document more evidence, prepare, and spend more time in the courtroom taking away from time they could be out on the street. And finally, there is the cost of "justice" lost because many courts are speeding up procedures to hurry their caseload through. A full investigation would probably uncover many additional system costs not listed here.
15. When government cost-effectiveness studies on incarceration fail to take into account the costs to the prisoners and their friends and relatives, society is in real danger. If prisoners are thought of as worthless and costs to their humanity are ignored, then the most cost-effective means of stopping crime is to (1) eliminate due process and (2) simply put a bullet in every person's head who is caught performing a criminal act. California hasn't become this extreme yet, but is it that much better to implement policies that head in that direction? FACTS has received letters and had many discussions with friends and family members regarding the suffering 3-Strikers and their families receive from being incarcerated under the 3-Strikes law. FACTS has put a small sample of its evidence on its web site under "3-Strike stories" at http://www.ags.uci.edu/~satij/FACTS.htm.
16. An Assemblymember at the California Assembly Public Safety Hearing on October 14, 1997 in Los Angeles estimated that over a hundred lives could be considered lost (including police officers) because people who have been apprehended for a 3rd Strike have decided to fight rather than submit to a "life sentence."
17. FACTS includes many spouses of 3-Strikers who are having great problems paying off bills and maintaining the lifestyle they were accustomed to before their loved-ones were incarcerated under the 3-Strikes law. Once again, see FACTS web site located at http://www.ags.uci.edu/~satij/FACTS.htm for documented stories.
18. Letters from 3-Strikers and their families collected by FACTS have consistently expressed their outrage at the injustice of a 3-Strike sentence. Once again this is documented at http://www.ags.uci.edu/~satij/FACTS.htm.
19. FACTS declines to calculate a total amount of cost-benefit savings because such an amount can be easily misinterpreted by those who do not realize the estimates and difficulty of measuring some of the variables. Instead, FACTS encourages individuals to try to make their own calculations.
20. Greenwood, et al., Diverting Children from a Life of Crime: Measuring Costs and Benefits.
21. Ibid.
22. Caulkins, et al. Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences: Throwing Away the Key or the Taxpayers' Money?
23. "Striking Out: The Crime Control Impact of 'Three-Strikes' Laws," by Vincent Schiraldi and Tara-Jen Ambrosio, March 1997, Justice Policy Institute and quote from Vincent Schiraldi on the Today Show, NBC, March 8, 1996.
24. Interestingly, Lungren even states that there is over a 2,000 to one difference in the value of the violent and serious crimes (not to mention the non-violent and non-serious crimes) committed when he values a murder at $2,940,000 and a burglary at only $1,400. Yet, he still wants to punish them equally.
25. See Steffensemeier and Allen, "Criminal Behavior: Gender and Age."
26. This is one of the fundamental principles of Total Quality Management. See Collard, Total Quality: Success Through People p. 143.
27. In February of 1996, the non-profit Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice issued a report raising questions about racial equality in arrests, incarcerations and sentencing statewide. In 1995, 39% of California's African American men in their 20s were in prison, jails or on probation. By comparison, 10% Latino men and 5% of white men in their 20s were in the same condition. While previous studies have suggested that blacks and whites use drugs at about the same rate, African Americans were arrested for drug offenses at about five times the rate of whites during the height of the drug war in 1989. African Americans are charged under California's 3-Strikes law at 17 times the rate of whites in Los Angeles and 13 times the rate of whites in San Francisco. "At almost every stage of the criminal justice process, whites fare better than African Americans or Latinos. One-third of whites who are first-time offenders had charges reduced compared to one-quarter of blacks and Latinos. White offenders also received rehabilitative placements in the community at twice the rate of African Americans and Latinos. And prison sentences for drug offenses were harsher for blacks and Latinos than whites: Latinos went to prison at twice the rate of whites; African Americans one-third more frequently. The data supports disparity at every level of the criminal justice system," said center Executive Director Vincent Schiraldi, who co-authored the report with the center's Sue Kuyper and Sharen Hewitt. "Study Spotlights Justice System's Racial Disparity" by Greg Krikorian, Los Angeles Times, February 13, 1996. In addition, FACTS members have frequently experienced that defendants who are represented by only public defenders get sentenced more often under the 3-Strikes law whereas offenders who are represented by private attorneys are more likely to get discretion from the prosecutor or judge and not have the 3-Strikes law applied in their case.
28. Statistics that demonstrate where the government puts its effort in law enforcement would also be interesting. FACTS believes that street crime is much more greatly emphasized as opposed to white-collar crime when white-collar crime can, in fact, be more costly to society. A brief summary of crimes committed by white-collar criminals includes toxic chemical dumps that have poisoned drinking supplies; cover-ups of asbestos-induced cancer; radioactive water leaking from improperly maintained nuclear reactors; injuries and deaths from unsafe coal mines and steel mines; the manufacturing of dangerous food and drug products, defective consumer goods, hazardous clothing materials; and health effects of noise and pollution in the air. See Hills, Corporate violence: Injury and death for profit; and Geis, "A Base on Balls for White-Collar Criminals." In addition, the cost of workplace fraud was estimated at $400 billion a year in a nationwide survey released in 1997 by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners in Austin, Texas. "The Crime Within," by James S. Granelli, October 19, 1997, Los Angeles Times D1.
29. Once again, a sample of stories is documented at FACTS' web site located at http://www.ags.uci.edu/~satij/FACTS.htm.
30. "Networks Doubled Crime Coverage in '93, Despite Flat Violence Levels in U.S. Society," by Michael Freeman, Mediaweek, 4:4, cited in Criminology: A Sociological Understanding, by Steven E. Barkan, 1997, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, p. 26.
31. "'Brutalized' Public Lives with Growing Fear", by Sam Vincent Meddis, (Oct. 28, 1993), USA Today, p. 6A; "'Politicians' Crime Rhetoric," by Derrick Z. Jackson, Oct. 21, 1994) ,The Boston Globe, p. 15. Gallup Polls, 1981--1995, by the Gallup Organization; all cited in Criminology: A Sociological Understanding, by Steven E. Barkan, 1997, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, pp. 26-27.
32. In addition, FACTS believes legislators and government officials should stop taking campaign contributions from government employees and private businesses who directly benefit from legislation that increases incarceration rates (e.g., prison guard unions, private construction firms). FACTS believes such donations are a direct conflict of interest in matters concerning the safety and justice of California citizens. The California Correctional Peace Officers Association (the California prison guard union) gave $1.5 million to California Governor Wilson's two campaigns, helping the governor amass a war chest that Don Novey, head of the CCPOA, boasted "put Wilson over the top." After Assemblyman John Vasconcellos (D-Santa Clara) signed a ballot argument against new prison construction and questioned pay for prison officers, the union spent $90,000 in 1992 attempting to unseat him. In 1994, the union was the second-largest donor to the 3-Strikes initiative, giving $101,000. In addition, in one six-month period in 1994 (the year the 3-Strikes law was passed) the union contributed $60,000 to Crime Victims United, a political action committee in Sacramento. Between 1995 and October of 1996, CCPOA gave $887,122 to scores of politicians and political organizations, according to campaign records. Attorney General Dan Lungren and former Assembly Speaker Curt Pringle, both Republicans, got more than $80,000 from the union in that period. And in one eight-week span during the summer of 1996, the union gave the Republican party $100,000. See "The Price of Punishment: The Booming Business of Running California's Prisons," Los Angeles Times, multi-part series, October 18, 1994 and "A State Behind Bars" Riverside Press-Enterprise, 5-part series (posted on the internet at http://www.pe.net/prison/html/union_guards.html (during the Spring of 1997).
33. In addition to the pain and suffering many 3-Strikers and their families' experience, there are at least two known suicides as a result of the 3-Strikes law. Steven White had two 1983 burglary convictions when he stole a $146 videocassette recorder in April of 1996. Rather than face the prospect of life in prison, Steven shot himself to death. He left three suicide notes: one to his family, another apologizing to police, and a third blaming the California state law. Steven was 32 years old. Families Against Mandatory Minimums (posted on its web site at http://www.famm.org/fammgr_July_1996/fammgr2.html during June of 1997). Also, Clinton James Warner shot and killed himself fearing he faced a 25-years-to-life prison sentence. The 22-year-old Fullerton resident was found Oct. 14, 1996 with a gunshot wound to his head. Police said a backpack found with the body contained a note from Warner about his worries of going to jail life. Warner, who had a string of past arrests for assault, drug possession and theft, was arrested twice during the summer for being under the influence of the drug methamphetamine. "Fear of prison leads man to suicide," by Meghan Hoyer, Orange County Register, October 16, 1996, Metro 4.
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Date last modified: 10/25/97.